Standing Committee D

[Mr. Eric Forth in the Chair]

Employment Relations Bill

Clause 23 - Inducements relating to union

Question proposed [this day], That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question again proposed.

Henry Bellingham: On a point of order, Mr. Forth. I gather that a money resolution in respect of the Bill is to be heard in the Chamber, so I should be grateful if the Minister clarified why that decision had been taken, said why we were not told before and explained the background to that move.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that point of order. In my opening remarks on Tuesday morning, I mentioned that the Government were considering how the union modernisation fund is to work. I hope that the detail of our amendments will be made available to members of the Committee by Tuesday of next week. Subsequent to that there will be a need for a money resolution, which will be discussed on the Floor of the House whenever that can be facilitated.

Eric Forth: I thank the Minister.

Jon Cruddas: This morning, I sought to raise three issues about the clause: first, concerns about ''solely or mainly'', which have been widely rehearsed in today's debate; secondly, the limited remedies available, on which the Minister gave quite a positive response; thirdly, points that relate to proposed new section 145B(5) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which says:
''A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal on the ground that his employer has made him an offer in contravention of this section.''
 Only individuals to whom inducements are offered can raise the issue at an employment tribunal. My concerns arise from practices to undermine the union. As far as I can see, the union can take action only if it is aware of such practices and only then to support an individual to whom inducements have been made. Furthermore, the member must be prepared to go a tribunal. 
 A clever employer who seeks to undermine the union will not offer inducements to members of the branch committee, trade union activists, shop stewards or lay officials. Rather, he will approach members who are, shall we say, less active. It takes a lot of coverage for a worker to come forward, activate the relevant procedures and stand up against an employer in those 
 circumstances. We might even imagine a scenario in which perhaps 10, 15 or 20 people in a bargaining unit or at a plant or workplace have accepted inducements to walk away from the union, but in which the union can do nothing unless someone is prepared to come forward and initiate the procedure outlined in proposed new section 145B(5). 
 Can the Minister clarify the situation? If what I have described is accurate, could the issue not be considered in a code of practice on unfair labour practices, such as the one we started to discuss on Tuesday afternoon? The proposals as drafted seem to offer a remedy to the individual but not to the union, even when the actions of the employer are aimed at challenging and undermining the union.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Thank you, Mr. Forth, and welcome to this afternoon's proceedings. We had an informed debate on the amendments to the clause, so I do not intend into great detail on the issues now. I should like to respond to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Jon Cruddas) made about why the individual is specified and not the union, although I would prefer to deal with unfair labour practices and intimidation at the appropriate points in the Bill.
 Existing rights operate in the way that my hon. Friend suggested and we believe that those rights belong to individuals and not the organisations to which they belong. Unions help their members to bring cases, which is one of the reasons for bringing in the union. However, having considered the relevant judgment closely, we do not believe that it implies that unions should be able to make a claim on their own behalf. The issues that my hon. Friend raised need to be considered in another context and we shall return to them later in the Bill. 
 The debates this morning were quite intense and involved. The clause stems from the judgment made by the European Court of Human Rights in 2002 in the Wilson and Palmer case. That judgment showed that aspects of our trade union law breached article 11 of the European convention on human rights on freedom of association. 
 The Government take their international obligations very seriously. From the outset, we said that we would amend the law as necessary to achieve compliance and we acted quickly, through the review of the Employment Relations Act 1999, to consult interested parties on the implications of the judgment. Clauses 23 to 26 contain our proposals to ensure that British trade union law fully complies with article 11. 
 Among other things, clause 23 makes it unlawful to offer union members an inducement to forgo key union rights. It was precisely such behaviour that gave rise to the Wilson and Palmer case. Workers in that case were offered cash inducements to have their contractual terms determined outside the scope of the collective agreement. 
 Those events occurred in the late 1980s in the climate of adversarial employment relations that the then Government were keen to promote. We, of course, favour different employment relations based on partnership and mutual respect at work. It is 
 noteworthy that such employer behaviour is much less evident today. The clause seeks to create a clear entitlement for union members to use the services of their union. It will no longer be possible for employers to punish individuals for asking their union to make representations on their behalf; a major advance. 
 This is a long and complicated clause, which inserts six new sections into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. I explained at some length in earlier debates what the main sections achieve. The clause will make it unlawful for employers to repeat the sort of behaviour exhibited in the Wilson and Palmer case and reinforces existing rights to trade union membership in accordance with our obligations under the European convention on human rights. Our discussion on the words ''solely or mainly'' was interesting and I will monitor what happens, as we do when Bills are enacted and implemented. The points made this morning by my hon. Friends were well made, and we will pay close attention to what happens. 
 The clause is important. I understand the Opposition's arguments and their need to press the matter to a vote because they disagree. I welcome the comments made this morning by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) that the Government have at least tried. I believe that we have gone further than that and have produced a workable solution on which we fully consulted. I hope that the Committee will support the clause.

Malcolm Bruce: Some issues of balance have been properly debated but, as a member of the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe, I want to uphold judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights, and can testify to the fact that the United Kingdom is assiduous among members of the Council of Europe in amending our law to comply with those judgments. Only objections made by other countries have made that difficult, such as in the case of Gibraltar, but we resolved the problem even then. It is right for the Government to take the opportunity to bring our law into line with judgments made by the ECHR.
 The Wilson and Palmer also involved the National Union of Journalists, of which I am a member—not that that will do me much good—and I was directly involved in a similar dispute in which I was confronted with what I believed to be an abuse of human rights. An employer said, in effect, ''Notwithstanding the fact that there is an established bargaining unit, a negotiating arrangement and a recognition of the union, the management have unilaterally decided to cease those arrangements. Instead, we require every employee to sign an individual contract with us, or we will terminate their employment.'' There was no resolution to that dispute, and the entire journalistic work force of that newspaper were sacked. I should add that that newspaper did not report my existence for the next two and a half years, although many unemployed journalists with nowhere else to go set up a lot of weekly newspapers in my constituency and wrote fulsome reports about me. I was re-elected, 
 although I am not saying that the two things are connected. 
 I find it difficult to believe that it is good employer practice to want to induce people to leave a union, and I wonder what the motivation might be. We need a clear indication of how the balance adjusts and how their proposals would remain consistent with the obligations under the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 I am sure that our Conservative colleagues, whatever their views about the issue and however unhappy they are about it, would not demur from the long-standing, established tradition that all Governments in the UK have fully respected the judgments of the European Court, even when those decisions were not always comfortable for those Governments. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights cannot function if founder members such as the United Kingdom do not support its findings and we have consistently done so. For those legal reasons and because of the need to bring the subject back in a way that is compatible with the ruling should there be genuine concern about the employer's decision, I will be unable to support the Conservatives if they wish to push the clause to a Division. Should they wish to reconsider, it might be possible for us to discuss the issue more fully at a later stage.

Jonathan Djanogly: As this is a set of new provisions, I should be grateful for clarification on a few points from the Minister.
 First, new section 145A extends the right of workers not to have an offer made to them by their employer where their employer's ''sole or main reason'' is to induce the worker 
''to make use . . . of trade union services''.
 I understand that this is a new provision. I should be grateful if the Minister explained what is encompassed by the reference to making use of union services and what led the Government to want to extend it for that purpose. 
 Secondly, I should like some clarification on proposed new section 145(E)(4)(a) and (b). The Minister will have to forgive me, but I have read the clause on a number of occasions and I still find it pretty unintelligible. I would be grateful if he could clarify what those paragraphs involve. 
 Thirdly, various hon. Members have referred to the European Court of Human Rights. The notes to the Bill set out the reasons as arising from the Wilson and Palmer case, where the court concluded that UK trade union law was incompatible with the European convention on human rights. 
 The explanatory notes also state: 
''The Government believe that the principle underlying the decision of the Court extends beyond the facts in Wilson and Palmer''.
 In his earlier remarks, the Minister referred to a consultation on that issue. I should be grateful if the Minister explained what the ''other comparable circumstances'' referred to in the notes were, and why he believed that the decision of the Court should be extended to them in those circumstances. 
 Without going over the many and detailed arguments that we had this morning, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk that the clause would not work in its current state. Its decisions on when inducement takes place will be too restrictive on employers and on employees. It will provide unwarranted and inflexible regulation on businesses; not least in terms of the fixed penalties, but also for the other reasons that we discussed. I shall be supporting my hon. Friend in voting against the clause.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce) for explaining his involvement in this issue and for going through the circumstances of the case with which he was involved. I am sure that that was at the time when adversarial issues were prominent in the then Government's attitude towards industrial relations. The context of today's debate has been the changing nature of what we are trying to achieve through the Bill and past Bills to bring partnership and people together.
 I am loth to go in to the detail that the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) wants, as he says that he will vote against the clause anyway. I do not see the purpose of going in to the issues he has raised in any great depth. He is clearly fundamentally opposed to the clause, and my explanation on all these—[Interruption.]—

Jonathan Djanogly: Will the Minister give way?

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am not going to give way, because the Committee is making good progress and doing well. I tried to be helpful to the hon. Member, but it is very difficult when a Member says, ''Whatever you say, I am going to vote against the clause.'' We have had an excellent debate this morning, we can touch on some of the issues the hon. Gentleman referred to during the amendments that are coming up, and we will get the explanations during that period.

Jonathan Djanogly: I respectfully say to the Minister that that is an unacceptable answer to my valid questions. The fact that my hon. Friend stated quite clearly that we saw the clause as unacceptable in its current form does not mean that we will not look at the form in a different context, or that we will not want to review it between now and Third Reading. It is a live issue for us however we vote, as presumably the Minister and his friends will vote it through. I ask that he respond to my questions.
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 2.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 - Extension of protection against detriment for union membership etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: This clause relates to the extension of protection against detriment for union membership. We tabled some amendments, but they were not selected because they went to the core of the clause. I can quite understand why the wise parliamentary Clerk decided that was the case, because we are concerned about—

Eric Forth: Order. The parliamentary Clerk does not decide what is selected; the Chairman does.

Henry Bellingham: I fully respect that, Mr. Forth. The clause removes the word ''employee'' and substitutes the word ''worker''. I put it to the Minister that ''employee'' is a great deal clearer than ''worker''. If somebody is working on a contract, he is either an employee or he is not; that is crystal clear. ''Worker'' is much wider. Is it really the Minister's intention to extend the provisions quite so widely?
 The workplace is becoming more fluid and more flexible. More and more companies are contracting out various types of work, and the work force comprises increasing numbers of temporary workers, agency workers and freelancers. The wording could cause complications, particularly in industries that rely a lot on self-employed freelance operatives, such as the music industry. Consider also the construction industry—where, although the Government are trying hard to bring many of the self-employed contractors onto payrolls through IR35, there is still a disparate pattern of employment—or the haulage industry, in which there are many large companies, some of which have substantial fleets of lorries. Most of us pass Eddie Stobart's lorries going up and down the motorway, or see them from the train. Most of those lorries are driven not by employees but by owner-drivers, although they are in the Eddie Stobart livery; that is just one example. 
 The workplace is changing fairly dramatically, and for the better. People want more flexibility but, far from being employees, they are self-employed contractors. Should they have rights under this clause? Do they expect them? I would submit that they do not. There does not seem to be any demand for it on their part, and I should not have thought that the trade unions were particularly concerned about the matter. Although I have not asked the TUC about this clause, I know that it is concerned about the position of agency workers. We have had lengthy discussions about the agency workers directive, which will give agency workers full contractual rights after a certain period. The directive is being considered carefully in Brussels and is currently in the long grass, but it might come back. 
 Why is a Bill about employment relations being used to widen the definition of ''employee''? Surely definitional issues such as this are not a matter for the Bill. They should be left to the Government's review of 
 employment status. How is that review coming along? The Government are already in discussion with Brussels on the agency workers directive, which will be vital in terms of atypical workers, as they are called in Europe. Is it necessary to bring in definitional changes in a Bill that is fairly narrow in its scope and should not be used for wider issues? 
 What representations has the Minister received from different unions? I have read a review of the 1999 Act; there did not seem to be much mention in it of pressure or representations from unions that have been surveyed, such as the TGWU and the Musicians Union. Is there significant pressure for the clause to be extended in that way? I should be grateful if the Minister gave us some answers.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving us the opportunity to answer his concerns, although he is perhaps confused about the reasons behind what we have done in the Bill; I shall return to those later.
 The hon. Gentleman asked when we could expect the outcome of the employment status review. As he knows, the consultation took a long time, and there were more than 400 responses. It is a complex issue, involving the various descriptions of workers and the jobs that they do, as well as issues such as the employment rights of the clergy. It is a detailed issue, but we are making good progress and expect to be able to explain our position on employment status shortly. There has been consultation with the trade unions, the TUC and the employers on the definitions. The hon. Gentleman was right to raise the issue, although he was wrong about what we are trying to achieve. 
 Clause 24 relates to the Wilson and Palmer judgment. As the hon. Member for Gordon said, our law breached article 11 of the European convention on human rights, which relates to the freedom of association. It relates specifically to the rights against detriment, which are provided for in section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Currently, section 146 applies only to employees, and the clause will ensure that workers, not just employees, benefit from those rights. 
 The reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights is based on the rights of trade union members, who can be employees or other categories of worker. In complying with the Court's judgment in the Wilson and Palmer case, we need to ensure that our improved protections for trade union members cover all such persons to the largest possible extent. Clause 23 ensures that the new rights that it contains not to be offered inducements apply to workers. Correspondingly, clause 24 extends the coverage of the existing rights not to suffer detriment on grounds of trade union membership and activities to workers. 
 Detriment can, of course, take the form of dismissal, and our amendments to section 146 will ensure that workers who are not employees can make a complaint under that section when their contracts are terminated. However, there are explicit protections against dismissal on the grounds of trade union 
 membership and activities in section 152 of the 1992 Act. In common with the rest of unfair dismissal legislation, those protections apply to employees only. To avoid duplication and possible confusion, we need to ensure that employees cannot use both sections 146 and 152 to make a complaint about dismissal. We achieve that in subsection (5) by making it clear that employees cannot use section 146 where detriment takes the form of dismissal. It may help if I mention that such provisions are used in other measures giving workers a right not to be subjected to detriment in relation to the termination of their contracts, and such measures have not given rise to difficulties. 
 For the present purposes, the definition of the term ''worker'' is that given in section 296 of the 1992 Act. I cannot be categorical about the types of person who might fall within that definition; that will depend on the precise facts of a case and ultimately will be for tribunals to decide. However, I can confirm that the Act's definition covers the vast bulk of agency workers and persons on fixed-term contracts. 
 Taken together, the effects of the clause are sensible and fit neatly with the important provisions of clauses 23, 25 and 26, allowing us to meet our international obligations. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Detriment for use of union services or

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in
clause 25, page 23, line 11, leave out 'or deterring' and insert 'him or taking action so as unreasonably to deter'.
 Subsection (2) refers to the employer preventing or deterring an employee 
''from making use of trade union services at an appropriate time, or penalising him for doing so''.
 I do not know why it does not say ''him or her''; perhaps the Minister could comment on that. 
 My tidying-up amendment replaces ''deterring'' and inserts 
''him or taking action so as unreasonably to deter''.
 From a legal point of view, it is slightly clearer to change the wording in that way. Amendment No. 47 is not grouped with it, but there will be related points concerning it.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Clause 25 stems from a 2002 judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in the Wilson and Palmer case. Clauses 23 to 26 ensure that we fully comply with article 11. Although there were differences on either side, there was common ground that we had to do something.
 For many years, it has been unlawful for employers to take detrimental action against employees on the ground of their union membership or non-membership, or on the ground of taking part in union activities at an appropriate time. The effect of clause 25 as required by the Wilson and Palmer 
 judgment is to strengthen the protections against suffering detriment in section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Among other things, the clause adds the use of trade union services to the list of grounds on which an employer must not subject an individual to detriment, and this is important. 
 The Wilson and Palmer case concerned the relationship between union members and their union. That is a precious relationship, which is protected under article 11 of the European convention. Put bluntly, the judgment makes it clear that the law should not permit the employer to place themselves between the parties in that relationship by acting to block or to influence the dealing between individual members and their union. Such dealings can obviously embrace the use of the union's services, so we concluded, and there is common ground on this, that the law needed to spell out clearly the entitlements to use the services of the union. That thought finds expression in clauses 23 to 26 as well. 
 It is important to remember that the protections to use union services extend only to the use of such services at an appropriate time. That provides the necessary protection for employers, ensuring that there is no entitlement to use the services at times that would inconvenience the employer. 
 Section 146 already contains a definition of ''at an appropriate time'', which is amended by subsection (3), so that it applies in an appropriate way to the right to make use of trade union services. The effect is, and I paraphrase here, that the member is entitled to use union services in his own time or during working hours under an arrangement agreed with, or with permission given by, the employer. 
 The amendment adds a further condition at that point. It seeks to allow the employer to deter the union member from using such services at such times as long as it is reasonable for the employer to do so. Quite frankly, I cannot see the point of adding that qualification to the entitlement. Does the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk want the employer to interfere with the worker's use of his own time? Does he want to allow the employer to aim to go back on agreements he had reached with the worker or the union about accessing union services during working time? We do not want such effects. It undermines the protection and thus our compliance with article 11. At the very least it complicates the law unnecessarily, and it could give rise to uncertainty, confusion and dispute. The entitlements that I have discussed already provide ample safeguards to the employer, and show that business is not disrupted in any way. In the light of this explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I am glad that he has at least given the Committee a chance to hear his side of the story, and to explain why he does not like the amendment. I do not fully accept his arguments, but obviously in the light of what he has said and in the spirit of the co-operative mood of the Committee, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 47, in
clause 25, page 23, leave out lines 30 to 37.
 If the employer suffers the penalty for inducement, it seems bizarre that the worker should be able to receive the benefit of the illegal inducement for which the employer has been fined. The employee could happily do a deal with his employer and then hold the employer to ransom for three months before taking it to tribunal, at which the employer must prove that there was no inducement, and after which the company may be fined while the worker retains the benefit of the illegal deal. 
 That seems incomprehensible to me. It is unfair, illogical and totally contrary to any concept of harmonious industrial relations. Workers could effectively use the law to induce employers. In such a situation, the workers could win the tribunal award and get better contract provisions as well.

John Lyons: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that action should be taken against people who break the law? It would seem strange to think nothing of allowing someone who has broken the law to be let off scot-free. Surely, we have to consider that.

Jonathan Djanogly: The person who has broken the law—the employer, in this case—will get a fine of £2,500. We have argued about the fine, but that is where we are. However, the measure does stop there. Not only will the company be fined, but the illegal contract will remain. That does not seem to follow.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Among other things, clause 25 introduces new rights not to suffer a detriment connected with trade union membership. They are introduced by subsection (4), and they work by inserting new subsections (2A), (2B), (2C) and (2D) into section 146 of the 1992 Act. As the hon. Member for Huntingdon will know, section 146 contains the existing rights on this issue. New subsections (2A) and (2B), which we have already discussed, deal with the right not to suffer a detriment for using union services. New subsections (2C) and (2D) deal with the right not to suffer a detriment for refusing an unlawful inducement as defined by proposed new sections 145A and 145B to the 1992 Act, which clause 23 introduces.
 Amendment No. 47 would delete subsections (2C) and (2D) and, therefore, would remove the corresponding new right not to suffer a detriment. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will concede that there is a case for the introduction of that right. If a trade union member initially refuses an unlawful inducement, he could be put under pressure to accept it, or punished for ultimately refusing to accept it. He could be demoted, relocated to a less attractive workplace, refused promotion or given inferior work tasks, or he could suffer a deduction from his pay. There is no clear-cut protection under the law to prevent that from happening. It is unlikely that a union member is protected under the existing terms of section 146, especially as that section has been interpreted narrowly in the past. Therefore, it makes sense to make explicit provision to protect individuals 
 against such reprehensible behaviour by employers. Therefore, new subsection (2C) is both helpful and necessary. 
 New subsection (2D) makes it clear that a union member, to whom an inducement is not paid because he refuses it, suffers a detriment equal to the value of that inducement. As I explained in our debate on amendment No. 45, that arrangement ensures that a member who refuses an inducement is not treated worse than members who accepted it. To do otherwise would penalise those who refused the offer, possibly out of principle. The amendment would remove parts of the protection that are necessary to deter unacceptable employer conduct. That is the hon. Gentleman's point with this amendment. It is about unacceptable employer conduct. We think that it will be a fair regime. Therefore, I ask the hon. Member, on reflection, to withdraw his amendment.

Jonathan Djanogly: Having heard the Minister's reply, I have not changed my mind much on this matter but, on the basis that it is likely to be reconsidered later, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave,withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: In the previous stand part debate, I made three requests of the Minister, two of which relate directly to this clause, as I think he intimated in his response, so I shall make them again. My first question relates to the interpretation of the Wilson and Palmer case. The notes accompanying the Bill state the Government's belief that the principle underlying the Court's decision extends beyond the facts of the Wilson and Palmer case and is applicable to other, comparable circumstances. Will the Minister explain what those comparable circumstances are and why he believes that the Court's decision should be extended to them?
 My second question relates to the definition of trade union services, which, according to proposed new subsection (2A)(a), means 
''services made available to the worker by an independent trade union by virtue of his membership of the union''.
 That is an extremely broad definition. Unions now pride themselves on the breadth of the services that they offer their members, from holiday travel packages to good deals on insurance. That is all to be welcomed and encouraged, but let us not forget that inducement means inducement not to use trade union services. Would inducement not to use the trade union's holiday travel package count as something for which an employer could be fined £2,500? The definition is so broad that it hardly makes any sense at all and certainly needs to be reconsidered. I shall be grateful to hear the Minister's view on that.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I will do my best, but clearly the hon. Gentleman has a perverse view on the services that trade unions offer in the context of the spirit of the Bill and the ways in which we are trying to improve relationships in employment, so as to benefit
 companies, individuals and the trade unions that represent them. He said that we had gold-plated the European Court's judgment, but that is not true. As I have said, we listened to the arguments put to us in the consultations and have tried to ensure that we remain within the framework of article 11. Through the spirit that we have tried to engender in the Bill, we feel that we have made the responsibilities clear, although that is open to interpretation and there are arguments from all sides about where the Government have finished up.
 The scope of trade union services includes those things that trade unions offer to their members in the world of employment and other things. The definition is clear but we must consider it in the context of what we are trying to achieve in the clause, which has to be set against that judgment.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister's explanatory notes say that the Government have applied the Wilson and Palmer case in a broader context than the Court. I should be interested to hear what explanation the Minister can offer for that decision and what representations he received.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Whatever I say, the hon. Gentleman will not agree, so I would probably be wasting both my time and the Committee's time by explaining our position. The consultation focused on the details of the judgment, in the context of the Bill and in the spirit of our attempt to meet the requirements of all parties relating to that judgment. The consultation was conducted in the spirit of employment relations today. That spirit was different in the days of the Wilson and Palmer case, when the hon. Gentleman's party, which has a different philosophy of dealing with industrial relations, was in power. We have tried to ensure that we support the position as fairly and clearly as possible, so that employers, unions and individuals know where they are. As I said earlier, however, I hope that the provisions will not apply in too many cases, because the spirit that we are trying to engender is different from that which prevailed when the problem first arose.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister has still not answered either of my questions, but let us put our discussion about the European Court of Human Rights to one side for the moment, because we have reached a dead end. Will he confirm that the clause would not apply if the company induced the employee to take up a holiday travel package that it was offering and to reject the union's travel package?

Gerry Sutcliffe: That would not be in the spirit of what we are trying to achieve. The definition of trade union services is fair, and I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not believe that I have answered his points. As I said at the start, nothing that I could say would answer them, and I cannot take the matter any further.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 - Dismissal for use of union services or

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: I am sorry that the Minister has a pessimistic view of his ability to convince my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon. My hon. Friend has entrenched views on trade unions, but I want to make it clear that he is not anti-union. None of the Opposition is at all anti-union. We simply want the law to operate fairly, to be improved, and to be as sensible as possible.
 The clause amends section 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 in order to add to the reasons that make the dismissal of an employee automatically unfair. The 1992 Act was important legislation. You may remember it, Mr. Forth. You may even have been the Minister who laid it before Parliament. It extends to 300 clauses, which is very neat; I presume that the then Minister used a little common sense to round it off in that way. For the purposes of part 5 of the Employment Protection Act 1978, section 152 of the 1992 Act states: 
''the dismissal of an employee shall be regarded as unfair if the reason for it . . . was that the employee . . . (a) was, or proposed to become, a member of an independent trade union, or (b) had taken part, or proposed to take part, in the activities of an independent trade union at an appropriate time, or (c) was not a member of any trade union, or of a particular trade union, or of one of a number of particular trade unions, or had refused, or proposed to refuse, to become or remain a member.''
 That is focused. It is a neat piece of legislation. Subsection (2) of the 1992 Act talks about appropriate times and again makes things clear. The section is fairly short. 
 The 1999 Act made changes to the 1992 Act. As far as I know, however, there was no feedback or commentary during consultation on the 1999 Act on that particular section of the 1992 Act. Will the Minister say why he wants to add to the reasons that make the dismissal of an employee automatically unfair? Why does he want to extend the meaning of ''an appropriate time'' under subsection (3), which amends section 152(2) of the 1992 Act? Section 152(2) clearly defines an appropriate time in a satisfactory and sufficiently wide-ranging way. 
 New subsection (2A)(a) defines ''trade union services''. Again, is there a need for that definition to be widened? Section 152 is being substantially widened. I carefully read the review of the 1999 Act. I do not want to repeat what we discussed on Second Reading, but there was obviously a degree of consensus that changes were needed to the law in the light of the Friction Dynamics case, the Wilson and Palmer case and the EU directive on information and consultation. We all agree that a small piece of legislation was needed, but the Opposition are not happy about the Bill being used to extend the remit and meaning of sections of the 1992 Act. The Act was well thought out and has been tested over several years, although some parts obviously needed updating, and that was discussed in the consultation. 
 We want to improve employment relations, as the Minister said, and to have a harmonious situation. To some extent, that has been achieved over the past 15 years or so. Every hon. Member would acknowledge that, and I would certainly argue that we now have a fair balance between management and trade unions; indeed, we probably have the best industrial relations of any country in Europe. Is there any need, therefore, unnecessarily to extend the law? I am concerned that the clause does just that. 
 We are not going to get into a big argument about the details of the clause, because it does not warrant that, but it makes small additions to section 152. Can the Minister fully explain why he wants to extend the meaning of ''an appropriate time'' and ''trade union services'' in the way proposed in the clause?

Gerry Sutcliffe: The hon. Gentleman outlines his opposition to the Government's position on the judgment. He welcomed our attempts to resolve the situation that arose in the light of it but then says that the Opposition cannot accept what we have done. I tried to explain that the context was that of an employer offering an inducement to an employee or worker and that we wanted to ensure that we met the requirements of article 11. We had an exchange earlier about whether the Government had gold-plated the judgment. I believe that, following the consultation, we sincerely tried to come up with the right way forward. This issue forms only a small part of present employment relations, which, I am pleased to say, the hon. Gentleman accepted had improved and continue to improve. When he makes his outrageous attacks on the Government's industrial relations policy, I will remind him that he accepted that things had improved.
 Clause 26 reflects our view of what we need to achieve. The judgment requires us to establish new rights to use union services and not to be offered inducements to relinquish key union rights. We need to extend the protections in section 152 to ensure that it covers the dismissal of an employee for using union services or refusing to accept such inducements. 
 Clause 26 makes the changes to section 152 necessary to achieve that outcome. It rounds off our response to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Wilson and Palmer case. They are workable proposals. We do not believe that they distort the balance more than necessary. We think it the right and proper thing to do in light of that judgment. 
 We have a difficulty, however, because we clearly do not agree about the response. The definition of union services is clear and in the spirit of what we are trying to achieve, and ''appropriate time'' is dealt with, so that people thoroughly understand what it means. I realise that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk does not accept that and that he will return to the matter. However, I have done my best to explain why the Government are in the present position. I know that the hon. Gentleman is not happy about it, but the judgment was clear. We have responded to the consultation, and we think that the best part of the process has been adopted in the clause. I hope that the Committee will support it.

Henry Bellingham: Before we leave the clause, I have two questions for the Minister. Although my face may look long and drawn, I am not that unhappy about clause 26. Did the Wilson and Palmer judgment really require the Government to extend the meaning of appropriate time? Did it really require them to extend the definition of trade union services? I ask those questions because in my opinion it does not.

Gerry Sutcliffe: It was not just the judgment. We wanted also to resolve the question of inducement in the context of employment relations, given the consultation and discussion that took place. As a
 result of the judgment, the Government realised the need to create a fair balance. I can add nothing more.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Charlotte Atkins.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at twenty-six minutes past Three o'clock till Tuesday 10 February at half-past Nine o'clock.